HEIDEGGER: Being and Time

HEIDEGGER:

Being and Time

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/

2.1 The Text and its Pre-History

Being and Time is a long and complex book. The reader is immediately struck by what Mulhall (2005, viii) calls the “tortured intensity of [Heidegger's] prose”, although if the text is read in its original German it is possible to hear the vast number of what appear to be neologisms as attempts to reanimate the German language. According to this latter gloss, the linguistic constructions concerned—which involve hyphenations, unusual prefixes, and uncommon suffixes—reveal the hidden meanings and resonances of ordinary talk. In any case, for many readers, the initially strange and difficult language of Being and Time is fully vindicated by the realization that Heidegger is struggling to say things for which our conventional terms and linguistic constructions are ultimately inadequate. Indeed, for some thinkers who have toiled in its wake, Heidegger's language becomes the language of philosophy (although for an alternative and critical view of the language of Being and Time, see Adorno 1964/2002).

Viewed from the perspective of Heidegger's own intentions, the work is incomplete. It was meant to have two parts, each of which was supposed to be divided into three divisions. What we have published under the title of Being and Time are the first two divisions of (the intended) part one. The reasons for this incompleteness will be explored later in this article.

One might reasonably depict the earliest period of Heidegger's philosophical work, in Freiburg (1915–23) and Marburg (1923–6), before he commenced the writing of Being and Time itself, as the pre-history of that seminal text (although for an alternative analysis that stresses not only a back-and-forth movement in Heidegger's earliest thought between theology and philosophy, but also the continuity between that earliest thought and the later philosophy, see van Buren 1994, 2005). Viewed in relation to Being and Time, the central philosophical theme in these early years is Heidegger's complex critical relationship with Husserl's transcendental phenomenology—what Crowell (2005, p.49) calls “a dynamic of attraction and repulsion”—as driven by Heidegger's transformative reading of Aristotle.

As early as a 1919 lecture course, for example, we find Heidegger arguing that Husserl's view (developed in the Logical Investigations, Husserl 1900/1973), that philosophy should renounce theory and concentrate on the things given directly in consciousness, is flawed because such givenness is itself a theoretical construct. For the young Heidegger, then, it is already the case that phenomenological analysis starts not with Husserlian intentionality (the consciousness of objects), but rather with an interpretation of the pre-theoretical conditions for there to be such intentionality.

This idea will later be central to, and elaborated within, Being and Time, by which point a number of important developments (explained in more detail later in this article) will have occurred in Heidegger's thinking: the Husserlian notion of formal ontology (the study of the a priori categories that describe objects of any sort, by means of our judgments and perceptions) will have been transformed into fundamental ontology (a neo-Aristotelian search for what it is that unites and makes possible our varied and diverse senses of what it is to be); Husserl's transcendental consciousness (the irreducible thinking ego or subject that makes possible objective inquiry) will have been transfigured into Dasein (the inherently social being who already operates with a pre-theoretical grasp of the a priori structures that make possible particular modes of Being); and Husserlian intentionality (a consciousness of objects) will have been replaced by the concept of care or Being-in-the-world (a non-intentional, or perhaps pre-intentional, openness to a world).

Each of these aspects of Heidegger's framework in Being and Time emerges out of his radical rethinking of Aristotle, a rethinking that finds its fullest and most explicit expression in a 1925–6 lecture course entitled Logik (later renamed Logik (Aristoteles) by Heidegger's student Helene Weiß, in order to distinguish this lecture course from a later one he gave also entitled Logik; see Kisiel 1993, 559, note 23).

On Heidegger's interpretation (see Sheehan 1975), Aristotle holds that since every meaningful appearance of beings involves an event in which a human being takes a being as-as, say, a ship in which one can sail or as a god that one should respect—what unites all the different modes of Being is that they realize some form of presence (present-ness) to human beings. This presence-to is expressed in the ‘as’ of ‘taking-as’. Thus the unity of the different modes of Being is grounded in a capacity for taking-as (making-present-to) that Aristotle argues is the essence of human existence. Heidegger's response, in effect, is to suggest that although Aristotle is on the right track, he has misconceived the deep structure of taking-as.

For Heidegger, taking-as is grounded not in multiple modes of presence, but rather in a more fundamental temporal unity (remember, it's Being and time, more on this later) that characterizes Being-in-the-world (care). This engagement with Aristotle—the Aristotle, that is, that Heidegger unearths during his early years in Freiburg and Marburg—explains why, as Sheehan (1975, 87) puts it, “Aristotle appears directly or indirectly on virtually every page” of Being and Time.

(For more on Heidegger's pre-Being-and-Time period, see e.g., Kisiel 1993, Kisiel and van Buren 1994, and Heidegger's early occasional writings as reproduced in the collection Becoming Heidegger. For more on the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger, see e.g., Crowell 2001 and the review of Crowell's book by Carman 2002; Dahlstrom 1994; Dostal 1993; Overgaard 2003.)

REFERENCE

Julien Offray de La Mettrie: Mind-body problem Notable ideas: Mechanistic materialism

Julien Offray de La Mettrie

Born 23 November 1709. Saint-Malo, France

Died 11 November 1751 (aged 41). Berlin, Prussia

Alma mater University of Rennes

Era 18th-century philosophy. Region: Western philosophy. School French materialism

Main interests: Mind-body problem

Notable ideas: Mechanistic materialism

Julien Offray de La Mettrie (French: [ɔfʁɛ də la metʁi]; November 23, 1709[1] – November 11, 1751) was a French physician and philosopher, and one of the earliest of the French materialists of the Enlightenment. He is best known for his work L'homme machine (Machine Man).[2]

Early life

La Mettrie was born at Saint-Malo in Brittany on November 23, 1709. La Mettrie entered the College d'Harcourt to study philosophy and natural science, probably graduating around 1728. At this time, D'Harcourt was pioneering the teaching of Cartesianism in France.[3] In 1734, he went on to study under Hermann Boerhaave, a renowned physician who, similarly, had originally intended on becoming a clergyman. It was under Boerhaave that La Mettrie was influenced to try to bring changes to medical education in France.[4]

Medical career

After his studies at D'Harcourt, La Mettrie decided to take up the profession of medicine. A friend of the La Mettrie family, François-Joseph Hunauld, who was about to take the chair of anatomy at the Jardin du Roi, seems to have influenced him in this decision. For five years, La Mettrie studied at the faculty of medicine in Paris and enjoyed the mentorship of Hunauld.[3]

In Leiden, La Mettrie studied under the famous physician Herman Boerhaave (pictured above)

In 1733, however, he departed for Leiden to study under the famous Herman Boerhaave. His stay in Holland proved to be short but influential. In the following years, La Mettrie settled down to professional medical practice in his home region of Saint-Malo, disseminating the works and theories of Boerhaave through the publication and translation of several works. 

It was in these years, during an attack of fever, that he made observations on himself with reference to the action of quickened blood circulation upon a thought, which led him to the conclusion that mental processes were to be accounted for as the effects of organic changes in the brain and nervous system. He developed his doctrines still more boldly and completely in L'Homme machine, a hastily written treatise based upon consistently materialistic and quasi-atheistic principles.[3] La Mettrie's materialism was in many ways the product of his medical concerns, drawing on the work of 17th-century predecessors such as the Epicurean physician Guillaume Lamy.[5]

Pierre Louis Maupertuis, also a native of Saint-Malo, helped La Mettrie find refuge in Prussia.

The ethical implications of these principles would later be worked out in his Discours sur le bonheur; La Mettrie considered it his magnum opus.[6] Here he developed his theory of remorse, i.e. his view about the inauspicious effects of the feelings of guilt acquired at an early age during the process of enculturation. This was the idea which brought him the enmity of virtually all thinkers of the French Enlightenment, and a damnation memoriae[7] which was lifted only a century later by Friedrich Albert Lange in his Geschichte des Materialismus.

Philosophy

Julien de La Mettrie is considered one of the most influential determinists of the eighteenth century. Along with aiding the furthering of determinism, he considered himself a mechanistic materialist.

He believed that mental processes were caused by the body. He expressed these thoughts in his most important work Man a Machine. There he also expressed his belief that humans worked like a machine. This theory can be considered to build off the work of Descartes and his approach to the human body working like a machine.[8] La Mettrie believed that man, body, and mind, worked like a machine. Although he helped further Descartes' view of mechanization in explaining human bodily behavior, he argued against Descartes' dualistic view on the mind. His opinions were so strong that he stated that Descartes was actually a materialist in regards to the mind.[9]

Man and the animal

Prior to Man a Machine he published The Natural History of the Soul in 1745. He argued that humans were just complex animals.[9] A great deal of controversy emerged due to his belief that "from animals to man there is no abrupt transition".[10] He later built on that idea: he claimed that humans and animals were composed of organized matter. He believed that humans and animals were only different in regards to the complexity that matter was organized. He compared the differences between man and animal to those of high-quality pendulum clocks and watches stating: "[Man] is to the ape, and to the most intelligent animals, as the planetary pendulum of Huygens is to a watch of Julien Le Roy".[10] The idea that essentially no real difference between humans and animals existed was based on his findings that sensory feelings were present in animals and plants.[11] 

While he did recognize that only humans spoke a language, he thought that animals were capable of learning a language. He used apes as an example, stating that if they were trained they would be "perfect [men]".[8] He further expressed his ideas that man was not very different from animals by suggesting that we learn through imitation as do animals.

His beliefs about humans and animals were based on two types of continuity. The first being weak continuity, suggesting that humans and animals are made of the same things but are organized differently. His main emphasis, however, was on strong continuity, the idea that the psychology and behavior between humans and animals were not all that different.

Man a Machine

La Mettrie believed that man worked as a machine due to mental thoughts depending on bodily actions. He then argued that the organization of matter at a high and complex level resulted in human thought. He did not believe in the existence of God. He rather chose to argue that the organization of humans was done to provide the best use of complex matter as possible.[9]

La Mettrie arrived at this belief after finding that his bodily and mental illnesses were associated with each other. After gathering enough evidence, in the medical and psychological fields, he published the book.[12]

Some of the evidence La Mettrie presented was disregarded due to the nature of it. He argued that events such as a beheaded chicken running around or a recently removed heart of an animal still working proved the connection between the brain and the body. While theories did build off La Mettrie's, his works were not necessarily scientific. Rather, his writings were controversial and defiant.[13]

Human nature

He further expressed his radical beliefs by asserting himself as a determinist, dismissing the use of judges.[8] He disagreed with Christian beliefs and emphasized the importance of going after sensual pleasure, a hedonistic approach to human behavior.[11] He further looked at human behavior by questioning the belief that humans have a higher sense of morality than animals. He noted that animals rarely tortured each other and argued that some animals were capable of some level of morality. He believed that as machines, humans would follow the law of nature and ignore their own interests for those of others.[9]

Influence

La Mettrie most directly influenced Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, a prominent French physician. He worked off La Mettrie's materialistic views but modified them to not be as extreme. La Mettrie's extreme beliefs were rejected strongly, but his work did help influence psychology, specifically behaviorism. His influence is seen in the reductionist approach of behavioral psychologists.[11] However, the backlash he received was so strong that many behaviorists knew very little to nothing about La Mettrie and rather built off other materialists with similar arguments.[9]

Later life: Flight to Prussia

The court of Frederick the Great provided La Mettrie with a refuge in which to write and publish his works

Part of a series on Hedonism, Thinkers, Schools of hedonism,

La Mettrie's hedonistic and materialistic principles caused outrage even in the relatively tolerant Netherlands. So strong was the feeling against him that in 1748 he was compelled to leave for Berlin, where, thanks in part to the offices of Maupertuis, the Prussian king Frederick the Great not only allowed him to practice as a physician but appointed him court reader. There La Mettrie wrote the Discours sur le bonheur (1748), which appalled leading Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire, Diderot, and D'Holbach due to its explicitly hedonistic sensualist principles which prioritized the unbridled pursuit of pleasure above all other things.[5]

La Mettrie's collected Œuvres philosophiques appeared after his death in several editions, published in London, Berlin, and Amsterdam.

 This article incorporates text from a publication now in the public domain: Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Lamettrie, Julien Offray de". Encyclopædia Britannica. 16 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. pp. 129–130.

Works

Selected works

Histoire Naturelle de l'Âme. 1745 (anon.)
École de la Volupté. 1746, 1747 (anon.)
Politique du Médecin de Machiavel. 1746 (anon.)
L'Homme Machine. 1748 (anon.)
L'Homme Plante. 1748 (anon.)
Ouvrage de Pénélope ou Machiavel en Médecine. 1748 (pseudonym: Aletheius Demetrius)
Discours sur le bonheur ou Anti-Sénèque [Traité de la vie heureuse, par Sénèque, avec un Discours du traducteur sur le même sujet]. 1748 (anon.)
L'Homme plus que Machine. 1748 (anon.)
Système d'Épicure. 1750 (anon.)
L'Art de Jouir. 1751 (anon.)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julien_Offray_de_La_Mettrie19/05/2019/ 23.29