domingo, 18 de febrero de 2018

Xavier Zubiri



Xavier Zubiri (1898 – 1983) Filosofo Español

Xavier Zubiri Apalategui es uno de los pensadores más originales de nuestro tiempo. Su filosofía, situada en la senda abierta por Husserl y por Heidegger, desemboca, más allá de la conciencia y de la existencia, en la aprehensión primordial de realidad. Esto le permite a Zubiri una nueva idea de la inteligencia, y una nueva idea de realidad. Es justamente la raíz de una nueva filosofía. Desde el análisis de la inteligencia sentiente, Zubiri ha podido abordar prácticamente todos los grandes temas de la filosofía clásica: desde la materia hasta la libertad, desde la evolución hasta el problema de la voluntad, desde la historia hasta el problema de Dios. Una gran síntesis filosófica que aún espera ser comprendida más exhaustivamente, aplicada a nuevos campos de saber, y conducida a nuevos niveles de radicalidad filosófica.

En el año 1926 Zubiri gana por oposición la cátedra de Historia de la Filosofía de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras en la Universidad Central de Madrid. Un magnífico grupo de pensadores, dispersados después por la guerra civil, comparten en aquellos años las aulas con Zubiri: Ortega y Gasset, Adolfo Bonilla San Martín, Manuel B. Cossío, Julián Besteiro, Manuel García Morente…. En el año 1929 Zubiri se traslada a Friburgo de Brisgovia, con el objeto de ampliar sus estudios, y allí sigue cursos con Husserl y con Martin Heidegger.

La reciente publicación de Sein und Zeit había convertido a Heidegger en el continuador y radicalizador de la fenomenología de Husserl. La conciencia de Husserl era desfondada, mostrando que la constitutiva imbricación entre el ser humano y el mundo se da ya en la misma “ex-sistencia”. El existente humano, enfrentado a la nihilidad y a la muerte, comprende que las cosas son, pero podrían no ser, y así se le desvela el ser de las cosas. Esta desvelación descubre ciertamente el ser de las cosas (y no el propio ser), pero solamente tiene lugar en el existente humano, quien por ello consiste en ser el “ahí del ser”, el Dasein.

La gran novedad filosófica la representa la publicación, en el año 1980, del primer volumen de su obra definitiva: la Inteligencia sentiente. Al primer volumen, Inteligencia y realidad, le siguen Inteligencia y logos (1982) e Inteligencia y razón (1983). En esta trilogía Zubiri no sólo aclara muchas dudas abiertas en Sobre la esencia, sino que posibilita una comprensión sistemática de su pensamiento desde su filosofía más madura. A partir de la Inteligencia sentiente, todas las preguntas sobre el presunto “realismo ingenuo” de Zubiri quedan definitivamente resueltas. La realidad es la formalidad de las cosas en la aprehensión, y no una zona de cosas “allende” la misma.

Desde este punto de vista, Zubiri puede afirmar, contra toda la filosofía moderna, que los colores son perfectamente reales, porque se actualizan en nuestra aprehensión visual como algo que es “de suyo” independiente de nuestra aprehensión. Ahora bien, esto no decide nada sobre lo que los colores sean allende la aprehensión. Esto es precisamente lo que la razón tiene que investigar. Y es que la formalidad de realidad constituye el punto de partida de la pregunta por la realidad profunda de las cosas. No se trata de un salto ni de un puente, sino de una profundización en la realidad. Por eso mismo, Zubiri puede afirmar que la ciencia no es una simple acumulación de conceptos construidos para manejar las cosas. La ciencia es mucho más: es un ingente esfuerzo de profundización en la realidad ya actualizada en la aprehensión.

Sin embargo, la obra de Zubiri sobre la inteligencia no pretende ser una filosofía de la ciencia, sino un análisis de la intelección humana en todas sus formas, desde las científicas hasta las artístísticas, desde las más elaboradas hasta las más cotidianas y banales


http://www.zubiri.net/?page_id=361


Xavier Zubiri (4 December 1898 – 21 September 1983) was a Spanish philosopher.

Biography

He was a member of the School of Madrid, composed by philosophers José Ortega y Gasset, Julián Marías and Pedro Laín Entralgo, among others. Zubiri's philosophy has been categorized as a "materialist open realism", which "attempted to reformulate classical metaphysics, in a language that was entirely compatible with modern science". 

This relates to Xavier Zubiri's educational background. Zubiri first received a philosophical and theological formation in Madrid and Rome. Later, he deepend his studies in philosophy through his graduate studies in Louvain, writing his dissertation on phenomenology. In 1929, Zubiri's critical interest in this current of thought took him to Freiburg, when he already was a professor in Madrid. There, he studied with Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger.

In 1930, Zubiri moved to Berlin, where he studied physics, philology and biology. There, he was hosted in Harnack House, which enabled Zubiri to socialize with important minds of this great period of academic activity in the Weimar republic. For example, Albert Einstein (whom Zubiri had already met in Madrid, at Universidad Central, in 1923), Max Planck, Werner Jaeger, Erwin Schrödinger, among others.

When civil war broke out in Spain in 1936, Zubiri moved to Paris. There, he continued having an intensive intellectual life, attending courses with Louis de Broglie, Frédéric Joliot, Irène Curie, Elie Joseph Cartan and Emile Benveniste, among others. In 1939, just before France declared war to Germany, Zubiri returned to Spain. Zubiri's philosophy is little known outside of Spain and Latin America, mostly because Zubiri was compelled to resign from formal academic positions in Spain, in 1942.

This had to do with the lack of academic freedoms in Francisco Franco's regime. However, it was possible for Zubiri to continue his work as an academic, through the sponsorship of family and friends. Zubiri was a prolific author in the Spanish magazines Cruz y Raya (led by José Bergamín) and Revista de Occidente (led by José Ortega y Gasset) under the second Spanish republic. However, after his resignation from Spanish universities, Zubiri did not publish much in established peer reviewed journals. Nonetheless, he did publish a series of books and research articles. 

Zubiri's work was initially not well received by established academic environments in Spain. This was mostly explained by the political context under Franco. But Zubiri's relationship to scholars like Ignacio Ellacuría made Zubiri's work widely known in Latin America, where Zubiri's thought has been further developed.

Recently, Spanish academics have begun to recognize the importance of Zubiri's life and philosophy. For the same reasons outlined above, Zubiri's contact with the formal academic environments of the English speaking world was limited. There is all but one recorded visit by Zubiri to the United States, specifically Princeton University, on October 2, 1946.

In Princeton, Zubiri lectured in French on "The real and mathematics- A philosophical problem" ("Le reel et les mathematiques—Un probleme de philosophie"). Some of Zubiri's work has been translated to English: "On Essence" (Caponigri, 1980), "Sentient Intelligence" (Fowler, 1999), "The Dynamic Structure of Reality" (Orringer, 2003)[18] and "The Fundamental problems of Western Metaphysics" (Redondo & Fowler 2009).

Despite his relative academic isolation at home in Spain, Zubiri has also been recognized in other countries. In 1979, the German government awarded Zubiri and Laín Entralgo the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany. Zubiri was awarded this distinction for his work in his books "Nature, History, God" (1954) and "On Essence" (1962).Zubiri's work has also been translated to French, German, Italian and Portuguese.

Referencias básicas de su obra:

Naturaleza, Historia, Dios (1944)
Sobre la esencia (1ª ed. 1962 en Soc.E y P; 6ª edición ya en Alianza, 1998)
Cinco lecciones de filosofía (1ª ed., 1963 en Soc.E y P; 1ª reimpresión en Alianza, 1997);
Inteligencia sentiente. *Inteligencia y realidad (Soc.E y P, 1980; 50 ed. Alianza/F.XZ.);
Inteligencia y logos (Soc.E y P/Alianza, 1982)
Inteligencia y razón (Soc.E y P/Alianza, 1983)


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xavier_Zubiri


domingo, 11 de febrero de 2018

Paul Feyerabend, Philosopher of Science says “Anything Goes”




Paul Feyerabend, Philosopher of Science says “Anything Goes”

April 9, 2014 by Janet Cameron Leave a Comment

The main image is from a window display at the museum in Banjul and relates to hunting. Until quite recently, hunting was a closed circle that played an important role in the interests of society. It was believed that hunters knew the secrets of the bush and forest and were connected with spiritual and magical beasts. Photo copyright: Janet Cameron 

Myth and science are often closely joined, and may reach similar conclusions. This image is from a window display at the museum in Banjul, The Gambia. Until quite recently, hunting was a closed circle that played an important role in the interests of society. People believed that hunters knew the secrets of the bush and forest and were connected with spiritual and magical beasts. 



Copyright image by Janet Cameron, all rights reserved.

Logical Positivism is the belief that philosophy should be based on observation and experimentation and that any result that cannot be verified must be false.

Therefore – the following statement, although shocking to many people – becomes even more shocking when considering its author is a formerly committed logical positivist.



As a result, Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994) caused a tremendous storm of dissent within academia. Here is his statement:

“Scientists have more money, more authority, more sex appeal than they deserve. The most stupid procedures and the laughable results are surrounded by an aura of excellence. It is time to cut them down in size, and to give them a more modest position in society” (Feyerabend 1975, quoted by 

Theodore Schick in Skeptical Enquirer.)
The Beginning of a Personal Rebellion



Feyerabend was born in Vienna, and studied at the London School of Economics under the philosopher, Karl Popper (1902-1994). Popper advocated scientific rationalism and, despite an early interest in communism, became a dedicated critic of Marx and Marxism.
So why did Paul Feyerabend, described by one of his critics as a “gadfly,” fall out with his formerly much-admired teacher and mentor?

Karl Popper lived in a time when Einstein’s theories began to have an impact on Newtonian science. In Philosophy, 100 Great Thinkers, Jeremy Harwood explains how Popper argued with the conventional empirical position that people could show scientific theories to be true.

“Even when a scientific principle had been repeatedly and successfully tested, it did not necessarily follow that it was correct, it simply meant it had not been proved false.”

No Such Thing as Certainty
Feyerabend’s “Theory of Falsification” demands a science where we challenge theories, rather than ending up as a kind of “pseudo-science.” “All truly scientific hypotheses… had to be ready to stand trial in the court of experience,” says Theodore Schick.



This applies equally to other disciplines such as politics, economics and philosophy. Popper prescribes an open society with open debate and tolerance for opposing viewpoints. Meanwhile, the “opposition” may follow its own path, unimpeded.

An open society where everyone is permitted to follow their own paths. Image by Janet Cameron

An open society permits everyone to follow his or her own path. Copyright image by Janet Cameron, all rights reserved.

Feyerabend’s Argument with Popper’s Scientific Rationalism
Paul Feyerabend came to believe it is not possible to get to the scientific truth for the following reasons, explained by Jeremy Harwood:

Individual theories are inconsistent with one another.



“…[C]ompetition provided by a plurality of possible alternatives,” which Feyerabend called “theoretical pluralism,” drove scientific research.

There are no such things as “facts.” By definition, all “facts” are theory-laden, and depend on what people believe or want to believe.”

We can only progress if “Anything Goes.”
One of the key aspects of Feyerabend’s philosophy is that a lack of rules allows science to progress. Stringent rules would only impede progress in scientific activity. That is why “Anything Goes.”
In the final chapter of Against Method, published in 1975, Feyerabend says:

“The idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious. It is unrealistic, for it takes too simple a view of the talents of man and of the circumstances which encourage, or cause, their development.”

The Menace of Rules and Dogma
An example of how rules and dogma impede science is that of the debunking by Western experts of 

The Yellow Emperor’s Textbook of Internal Medicine. In the 1950s, the Chinese communists compelled hospitals to use these medicines for patients’ treatment, horrifying Western thinkers who predicted that Chinese medicine would come to an ignominous end.

“What happened was the exact opposite. Acupuncture, moxibustion, pulse diagnosis have led to new insights, new methods of treatment, new problems both for the Western and for the Chinese physician,” says Feyerabend in Against Method.

Medicine has profited enormously from herbal lore, from the physiology of witches and “cunning” men, from medieval midwives and druggists. We have gained in knowledge through the astronomy of mystics.

“Everywhere science is enriched by unscientific methods and unscientific results, while procedures which have often been regarded as essential parts of science, are quietly suspended or circumvented,” continues Feyerabend.



Anti-Technological Hero and Maverick
Therefore, according to Feyerabend, you can’t differentiate between science and astrology, alternative medicine or voodoo. Although this may sound like a flippant remark, Feyerabend took his time before abandoning his empirical views, and embracing theoretical pluralism and with it, the idea that science has no specific claim to truth. He claims that the best method for scientific discovery is to choose the best theory for promoting understanding.

Feyerabend goes even further, claiming that science is a religion because it is based on dogma, and dogma cannot be justified by reason.

Theodore Schick agrees, “Science is much closer to myth than scientific philosophy is prepared to admit,” he says.

On Being a Mature Citizen

The real issue for Feyerabend, according to Schick, is not to attempt to choose between a scientific belief, or a pseudo-scientific belief, but between a belief that is justified over one that is not justified.  

In Against Method, Feyerabend says:  

“A mature citizen is not a man who has been instructed in a special ideology, such as Puritanism, or critical rationalism, and who now carries this ideology with him like a mental tumour, a mature citizen is a person who has learned how to make up his mind and who has then decided in favour of what he thinks suits him best.”

Feyerabend’s Multi-Faceted and Tempestuous Life

Feyerabend was passionate about green issues in his lifetime, for which he was much admired. Before embarking on his philosophical career, he worked in stage management, and was an accomplished singer. You can find an excellent and comprehensive biography at the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, charting the events of Feyerabend’s tempestuous life.

http://decodedpast.com/paul-feyerabend-philosopher-science-says-anything-goes/7823

sábado, 3 de febrero de 2018

Simone Weil

Simone Weil




FRENCH PHILOSOPHER
WRITTEN BY: The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica


Simone Weil, (born February 3, 1909, Paris, France—died August 24, 1943, Ashford, Kent, England), French mystic, social philosopher, and activist in the French Resistance during World War II, whose posthumously published works had particular influence on French and English social thought.

Intellectually precocious, Weil also expressed social awareness at an early age. At five she refused sugar because the French soldiers at the front during World War I had none, and at six she was quoting the French dramatic poet Jean Racine (1639–99). In addition to studies in philosophy, classical philology, and science, Weil continued to embark on new learning projects as the need arose.

She taught philosophy in several girls’ schools from 1931 to 1938 and often became embroiled in conflicts with school boards as a result of her social activism, which entailed picketing, refusing to eat more than those on relief, and writing for leftist journals.



To learn the psychological effects of heavy industrial labour, she took a job in 1934–35 in an auto factory, where she observed the spiritually deadening effect of machines on her fellow workers. In 1936 she joined an anarchist unit near Zaragoza, Spain, training for action in the Spanish Civil War, but after an accident in which she was badly scalded by boiling oil, she went to Portugal to recuperate. Soon thereafter Weil had the first of several mystical experiences, and she subsequently came to view her social concerns as “ersatz Divinity.” After the German occupation of Paris during World War II, Weil moved to the south of France, where she worked as a farm servant. She escaped with her parents to the United States in 1942 but then went to London to work with the French Resistance. To identify herself with her French compatriots under German occupation, Weil refused to eat more than the official ration in occupied France. Malnutrition and overwork led to a physical collapse, and during her hospitalization she was found to have tuberculosis. She died after a few months spent in a sanatorium.

Weil’s writings, which were collected and published after her death, fill about 20 volumes. Her most important works are La Pesanteur et la grâce (1947; Gravity and Grace), a collection of religious essays and aphorisms; L’Enracinement (1949; The Need for Roots), an essay upon the obligations of the individual and the state; Attente de Dieu (1950; Waiting for God), a spiritual autobiography; Oppression et Liberté (1955; Oppression and Liberty), a collection of political and philosophical essays on war, factory work, language, and other topics; and three volumes of Cahiers (1951–56; Notebooks). Though born of Jewish parents, Weil eventually adopted a mystical theology that came very close to Roman Catholicism. A moral idealist committed to a vision of social justice, Weil in her writings explored her own religious life while also analyzing the individual’s relation with the state and God, the spiritual shortcomings of modern industrial society, and the horrors of totalitarianism.

Her brilliance, ascetic lifestyle, introversion, and eccentricity limited her ability to mix with others, but not to teach and participate in political movements of her time. She wrote extensively with both insight and breadth about political movements of which she was a part and later about spiritual mysticism. Weil biographer Gabriella Fiori writes that Weil was "a moral genius in the orbit of ethics, a genius of immense revolutionary range".

Simone Weil
Susan Sontag FEBRUARY 1, 1963 ISSUE
Selected Essays
by Simone Weil, translated by Richard Rees




The culture-heroes of our liberal bourgeois civilization are anti-liberal and anti-bourgeois; they are writers who are repetitive, obsessive, and impolite, who impress by force—not simply by their tone of personal authority and by their intellectual ardor, but by the sense of acute personal and intellectual extremity. The bigots, the hysterics, the destroyers of the self—these are the writers who bear witness to the fearful polite time in which we live. It is mostly a matter of tone: it is hardly possible to give credence to ideas uttered in the impersonal tones of sanity.

There are certain eras which are too complex, too deafened by contradictory historical and intellectual experiences, to hear the voice of sanity. Sanity becomes compromise, evasion, a lie. Ours is an age which consciously pursues health, and yet only believes in the reality of sickness. The truths we respect are those born of affliction. We measure truth in terms of the cost to the writer in suffering—rather than by the standard of an objective truth to which a writer’s words correspond. Each of our truths must have a martyr.

What revolted the mature Goethe in the young Kleist, who submitted his work to the elder statesman of German letters “on the knees of his heart”—the morbid, the hysterical, the sense of the unhealthy, the enormous indulgence in suffering out of which Kliest’s plays and tales were mined—is just what we value today. Today Kleist gives pleasure, Goethe is to some a duty. In the same way, such writers as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dostoyevsky, Kafka, Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Genet—and Simone Weil—have their authority with us because of their air of unhealthiness. Their unhealthiness is their soundness, and is what carries conviction.

Perhaps there are certain ages which do not need truth as much as they need a deepening of the sense of reality, a widening of the imagination. I, for one, do not doubt that the sane view of the world is the true one. But is that what is always wanted, truth? The need for truth is not constant; no more than is the need for repose. An idea which is a distortion may have a greater intellectual thrust than the truth; it may better serve the needs of the spirit, which vary. The truth is balance, but the opposite of truth, which is unbalance, may not be a lie.

Thus I do not mean to decry a fashion, but to underscore the motive behind the contemporary taste for the extreme in art and thought. All that is necessary is that we not be hypocritical, that we recognize why we read and admire writers like Simone Weil. I cannot believe that more than a handful of the tens of thousands of readers she has won since the posthumous publication of her books and essays really share her ideas. Nor is it necessary—necessary to share Simone Weil’s anguished and unconsummated love affair with the Catholic Church, or accept her gnostic theology of divine absence, or espouse her ideals of body denial, or concur in her violently unfair hatred of Roman civilization and the Jews.

Similarly, with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche; most of their modern admirers could not, and do not embrace their ideas. We read writers of such scathing originality for their personal authority, for the example of their seriousness, for their manifest willingness to sacrifice themselves for their truths, and—only piecemeal—for their “views.” As the corrupt Alcibiades followed Socrates, unable and unwilling to change his own life, but moved, enriched, and full of love; so the sensitive modern reader pays his respect to a level of spiritual reality which is not, could not, be his own.



Some lives are exemplary, others not; and of exemplary lives, there are those which invite us to imitate them, and those which we regard from a distance with a mixture of revulsion, pity, and reverence. It is, roughly, the difference between the hero and the saint (if one may use the latter term in an aesthetic, rather than a religious sense). Such a life, absurd in its exaggerations and degree of self-mutilation—like Kleist’s, like Kierkegaard’s—was Simone Weil’s. I am thinking of the fanatical asceticism of Simone Weil’s life, her contempt for pleasure and for happiness, her noble and ridiculous political gestures, her elaborate self-denials, her tireless courting of affliction; and I do not exclude her homeliness, her physical clumsiness, her migraines, her tuberculosis.

No one who loves life would wish to imitate her dedication to martyrdom nor would wish it for his children nor for anyone else whom he loves. Yet so far as we love seriousness, as well as life, we are moved by it, nourished by it. In the respect we pay to such lives, we acknowledge the presence of mystery in the world—and mystery is just what the secure possession of the truth, an objective truth, denies. In this sense, all truth is superficial; and some (but not all) distortions of the truth, some (but not all) insanity, some (but not all) unhealthiness, some (but not all) denials of life are truth-giving, sanity-producing, health-creating, and life-enhancing.

This new volume of translations from Simone Weil’s work, Selected Essays 1934-43, displays her somewhat marginally. It contains one great essay, the opening essay here titled “Human Personality” which was written in 1943, the year of her death in England at the age of thirty-four. (This essay, by the way, was first published in two parts under the title “The Fallacy of Human Rights” in the British magazine The Twentieth Century in May and June 1959.

There it suffered the curious and instructive fate of requiring a defensive editorial in June, when the second part of the essay appeared, replying to criticism of the magazine’s decision to publish the essay “on the grounds that it involves heavy going for some readers.” It certainly speaks volumes about the philistine level of English intellectual life, if even as good a magazine as The Tweentieth Century cannot muster an enthusiastic, grateful audience for such a piece.) Another essay, placed last in the book, called “Draft for a Statement of Human Obligations,” also written the year of her death, contains matter central to Simone Weil’s ideas.

The remaining essays are on specific historical and political subjects—two on the civilization of Languedoc, one on a proletarian uprising in Renaissance Florence, several long essays on the Roman Empire which draw an extensive parallel between imperial Rome and Hitler’s Germany, and various reflections on the Second World War, the colonial problem, and the post-war future. There is also an interesting and sensitive letter to George Bernanos. The longest argument of the book, spanning several essays, develops the parallel between Rome (and the ancient Hebrew theocracy!) and Nazi Germany. According to Simone Weil, who displays an unpleasant silence on the Nazi persecution of the Jews, Hitler is no worse than Napoleon, than Richelieu, than Caesar. Hitler’s racialism, she says, is nothing more than “a rather more romantic name for nationalism.” Her fascination with the psychological effects of wielding power and submitting to coercion, combined with her strict denial of any idea of historical progress, led her to equate all forms of state authority as manifestations of what she calls “the great beast.”

Readers of Simone Weil’s Notebooks (two volumes, published in 1959) and her Intimations of Christianity Among the Ancient Greeks (1958) will be familiar with her attempt to derive everything distinctively Christian from Greek spirituality as well as to deny entirely Chrisianity’s Hebraic origins. This fundamental argument—along with her admiration for Provençal civilization, for the Manichean and Catharist heresies—colors all her historical essays. I cannot accept Simone Weil’s gnostic reading of Christianity as historically sound (its religious truth is another matter); nor can I fail to be offended by the vindictive parallels she draws between Nazism, Rome, and Israel. Impartiality, no more than a sense of humor, is not the virtue of a writer like Simone Weil. Like Gibbon (whose view of the Roman Empire she absolutely contradicts), Simone Weil as a historical writer is tendentious, exhaustive, and infuriatingly certain.

As a historian she is simply not at her best; no one who disbelieves so fundamentally in the phenomena of historical change and innovation can be wholly satisfying as a historian. This is not to deny that there are subtle historical insights in these essays: as for example, when she points out that Hitlerism consists in the application by Germany to the European continent, and the white race generally, of colonial methods of conquest and domination. (Immediately after, of course, she says that these—both Hitler’s methods and the “normal colonial ones”—are derived from the Roman model.)

The principal value of the collection is simply that anything from Simone Weil’s pen is worth reading. It is perhaps not the book to start one’s acquaintance with this writer—Waiting for God, I think, is the best for that. The originality of her psychological insight, the passion and subtlety of her theological imagination , the fecundity of her exegetical talents are unevenly displayed here. Yet the person of Simone Weil is here as surely as in any of her other books—the person who is excruciatingly identical with her ideas, the person who is rightly regarded as one of the most uncompromising and troubling witnesses to the modern travail of the spirit.
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1963/02/01/simone-weil/

miércoles, 31 de enero de 2018

Conmemorando la obra de Bertrand Russell y de Imre Lakatos:

Conmemorando la obra de
 Bertrand Russell y de 
Imre Lakatos:






El 2 de febrero se conmemora la fecha en que Sir Bertrand Russell e Imre Lakatos pasaron a ocupar su lugar en el oriente eterno.

Cada uno dejo una impronta de valor para quienes tenemos presentes los valores de la filosofía como modo de vida.

Bertrand Russell en PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA nos lego la posibilidad de comprensión de los lenguajes formales.




En matemáticas su grán contribución es la indudablemente importante Principia Mathematica con Alfred North Whitehead, libro en tres volúmenes en donde a partir de ciertas nociones básicas de la lógica y la teoría de conjuntos se deduce la totalidad de las matemáticas. Mostrando así el poder de los lenguajes formales, la posibilidad de modelar las matemáticas y la fertilidad de la lógica. 

Un libro profundamente influyente e importante que contribuyó al desarrollo de la lógica, la teoría de conjuntos, la inteligencia artificial y la computación así como la formación de pensadores de la talla de David Hilbert, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alan Turing, Willard Van Orman Quine y Kurt Gödel.







Imre Lakatos en el campo de la formalidad de las teorías con su METODOLOGÍA DE PROGRAMAS CIENTÍFICOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN formuló avances pioneros en la lógica de los programas de investigación.

Lakatos dio a conocer su “Metodología” en 1965, con motivo del Coloquio Internacional de Filosofía de la Ciencia, celebrado en Londres. En esa ocasión el grupo de la LSE (llamado informalmente “el grupo Popperiano”) criticó La Estructura de las revoluciones científicas de Kuhn (1962) y la “Nueva imagen” de la ciencia que de él se deriva.


La postura filosófica de Lakatos se basa en el modelo de que cuando fallan algunas de las predicciones derivadas de una teoría, esta se conserva mientras se afina, sin eliminarse. Estas situaciones conocidas como anomalías según Lakatos constituyen la regla. Propone que el punto de comparación deben ser conjuntos de teorías, generadas por modificaciones sucesivas de sus predecesores, a las cuales denomina programas científicos de investigación.


Ver referencia en mi Página URBANOPERU.com 


Ver Filosofía de la Ciencia: en URBANOPERU.com






sábado, 30 de diciembre de 2017

Semiótica:



Semiótica:

El vocablo Semiótica fué empleado en la antiguedad helénica (s. III a.c.) para designar la parte de la medicina que se ocupaba de interpretar los signos de las enfermedades. Al final del Corpus Hippocraticum ya hay referencia a los procesos de inferencia de los signos.


Galeno El médico más famoso de la antiguedad
Galeno en el  s. II empleaba la expresión Semiótica, shmeiwtikh  tekne, (semeiotike, tekne). Igualmente Tolomeo realizó un empleo musical del término en su Armónica.
Filomeno de Gadara empleaba el termino shmeiwsis  (semeiosis) en el sentido de inferencia de un signo.

PHILODEMUS, Epicurean philosopher and poet, was born at Gadara in Coele-Syria early in the ist century B.C., and settled in Rome in the time of Cicero. He was a friend of Calpurnius Piso, and was implicated in his profligacy by Cicero (in Pisonem, 29), who, however, praises him warmly for his philosophic views and for the elegans lascivia of his poems (cf. Horace, Satires, 1.2. 120).

The Greek anthology contains thirty-four of his epigrams. From the excavations of the villa at Herculaneum there have been recovered thirtysix treatises attributed to Philodemus, and it has been suggested that the villa was actually owned by him; but this is generally denied. These works deal with music, rhetoric, ethics, signs, virtues and vices, and defend the Epicurean standpoint against the Stoics and the Peripatetics.

http://www.1911encyclopedia.org/Philodemus



Filomeno de Gadara
Semiótica
La teoría de los signos, semiótica, tuvo un importante desarrollo en la obra de los sofistas, en la de Platón y Aristoteles, en los estoicos, epicúreos y en la de en los escépticos. La idea de signo y el propio objeto, planteada por los estoicos se encuentra en mucha de la S contemporanea.

Las primeras reflexiones sobre los signos se remontan a las prácticas adivinarias de Mesopotamia. y se observan en Grecia a partir de Homero. En el Crátilo de Platón y en las Categorías de Aristóteles se encuentra teorías elaboradas sobre el signo y el lenguaje.

En la Edad Media igualmente hubo desarrollo de estudios semióticos entre los lógicos gramáticos especulativos. En el medievo se elaboró reflexiones sobre el signo en contextos variados desde la teología sacramental hasta la historiografía, a la retórica, astrología, a la teoría de la percepción, e incluso la lógica. Principalmente podemos nombrar a Anselmo de Aosta, Abelardo, R. Bacon, y notablemte a la teoría occamista del concepto como signo. También son de suma importancia las reflexiones del cabalismo hebreo y cristiano entre el medioevo y el renacimiento.

San Agustin (s. IV) fue el primero en reconocer el signo como genus del que una especie es el lenguaje.

En la edad Moderna, en la obra de Locke se encuentra también referencia al término,  en su Ensayo de 1690 divide el conocimiento humano en filosofía natural, ética y semiótica. Locke consideraba a la  shmeiwtikh como equivalente a la lógica como teoría de los signos verbales.

Lambert denominó Semiotik a la tercera parte de su Nuevo Organo  entendiendola a la manera de Leibniz, como ciencia de una "lengua carácterística".

Leibnitz, Francis Bacon, Hobbes, Spinoza también aportaron en este contexto. Se complementan estos aportes con las variadas voces semióticas desde la Enciclopedia, Condillac, los Ideologues y las discuciones de los s, XVII, XVIII en torno a las posibilidades de una lengua perfecta.


L. Wittgenstein
Contemporaneamente la temática semiótica es central aunque tratada de modos diferentes en la obra de autores como Frege, Wittgenstein, Russell, en el neopositivismo lógico, en la filosofía analítica del lenguaje, en la fenomenología, en la hermenéutica, linguistica y en la semántica generativa.


Sir Bertrand Rusell.
Los fundamentos de la S como disciplina autónoma se remontan a la obra de Charles Sanders Peirce y a Ferdinand de Saussure. 

Charles Sanders Peirce


Ch. S. Peirce
Inicialmente Peirce, adhiriendose al uso que le da Locke, define el término S:
 "La lógica en su sentido general, es, como creo haberlo demostrado, solo otro nombre para la S; la doctrina de los signos casi necesaria o formal."

Posteriormente Peirce define la S, como la "disciplina de la naturaleza esencial y de las variedades fundamentales de toda semiósis posible."

De acuerdo con Morris y Peirce la S "no se ocupa del estudio de un tipo particular de objetos , sino de objetos ordinarios como participes de la semiosis."

La S de Peirce, en coherencia con su pragmaticismo, se caracterizó por una concepción dinámica y de interacción. De este modo el significado de un signo reside en la cadena infinita de sus interpretaciones, pero en particular en su interpretador final, constituido por la costumbre o el habito de la conducta que el signo determina en quienes lo interpretan y emplean.

El pensamiento de Peirce fue retomado por Charles Morris en el marco del proyecto de una Enciclopedia internacional de la ciencia unificada. (Foundations of the Theory of signs).

Ch. W. Morris. 
Según Ch. W. Morris la semiótica designa a la ciencia general de los signos. Considera que hay dos tipos de semiótica: la mentalista (psicológica) según la cual el interprete del signo es el espíritu y el interpretante es un concepto. La del tipo conductista en la que el interprete es un organismo y el interpretante es una secuencia conductista (behaviorista).


Ch. W. Morris
Hoy se acepta que la semiótica tiene tres partes: la sintaxis, la semantica y la pragmática. La semiótica trata de cada una de las cuestiones tratadas en c/u.
Peirce, Ogden y Richards  al igual que Charles W, Morris han considerado el termino S como central en las investigaciones lógicas y filosóficas.

Ferdinand de Saussure:


Ferdinand de Saussure
El linguista FS en su CL (1916) anunciaba que se puede concebir una ciencia que estudie la vida de los signos en el curso de la vida social. Por lo tanto, la atención de Saussure se centraba en el lenguaje natural y en particular en la lengua, entendida como sistema abstracto de signos. 

Saussure propuso una serie de conceptos a los cuales susesivamente hacen referencia el estructuralismo  en general y la S estructuralista:
  • la distinción entre lengua y palabra.
  • la distinción entre linguistica sincrónica y diacrónica
  • la concepción de signo como entidad con dos rostros
  • delineó una teoria linguistica como ciencia de la forma
Los primcipios de Saussure fueron retomados a partir de 1930 por Louis Hjelslev, quien elaboró la glosemática.

LOUIS HJELMSLEV




ASPECTOS BIBLIOGRÁFICOS
- (1899-1963) era un lingüista danés cuya obra es un eslabón indispensable para comprender la evolución de la lingüística moderna surgida de las intuiciones de Saussure.

OBRAS CENTRALES
-Su libro más importante, los Prolegomena, fue publicado en 1943. Supone una crítica de la metodología utilizada hasta el momento por la lingüística, que resultaba descriptiva de forma no sistemática. Hjelmslev propuso una teoría lingüística cuyo fin eran una lingüística más general y contribuir a la epistemología general. Al igual que Saussure, consideró la lingüística como parte de la semiótica (ciencia de los signos). Según su análisis, el signo es una forma, es decir: es posible describirlo empíricamente, pero su sustancia es antológicamente especulativa (puede interpretarse de forma diferente a como quiso el emisor).

-Otra de sus obras fueron El lenguaje, escrito en la misma época y publicado en 1963, así como la serie de artículos recogidos bajo el título de Ensayos lingüísticos (1959), construyen su teoría de la glosemática, que profundiza en algunas de las hipótesis propugnadas por Saussure y Una introducción (1963),  Hjelmslev se dedicó a examinar los problemas teóricos de la lingüística.

-Hjelmslev que fundó con V. Brondal la revista Acta lingüística en 1937, sostenía que los elementos lingüísticos analizados se definen por sus relaciones combinatorias de acuerdo con el modelo fonológico. Otra de sus obras más destacadas, figuran Principios de gramática general (1928) en donde intentó "delimitar lo más netamente posible" los dominios de la lingüística.

PRINCIPALES APORTES
-Hjelmslev añade dos caras más a cada una de las caras de Saussure: tanto el contenido (significado) como la expresión (significante) tienen forma y substancia. 

-La función semiótica se establece entre la forma del contenido y la forma de la expresión; mientras que la substancia del contenido (el pensamiento) y la substancia de la expresión (la cadena fónica) dependen exclusivamente de la forma y no tienen existencia independiente. Este homomorfismo entre el plano de la expresión y el plano del contenido abre las puertas a una semántica estructural.

-En un trabajo afirma que la lingüística "es un metalenguaje de primer grado, mientras que la fonética y semántica son metalenguajes de segundo grado". Greimas y Courtés (1979) resaltan "el esfuerzo teórico de L. Hjelmslev para quien el metalenguaje es una semiótica, vale decir una jerarquía." Va subrayado que en la construcción teórica de Hjelmslev se llama semiótica no a la disciplina que estudia los signos sino al sistema de signos. 

-Para Hjelmslev, la semiótica no es una disciplina sino un sistema, que puede ser o bien una lengua natural o bien un juego como el ajedrez, o cualquier otro sistema que satisfaga la definición dada. Hjelmslev clasifica a las semióticas en denotativas, connotativas y meta semióticas: "la semiótica denotativa, es aquella en la que ninguno de sus planos es una semiótica.

-Su postulado del paralelismo (más precisamente del homomorfismo) entre el plano de la expresión y el plano del contenido abre las puertas a una semántica (comúnmente llamada estructural) mediante la simple transferencia de las distinciones (o distancias diferenciales) constatadas en el plano de la expresión a las distinciones en el plano del contenido.

-La glosemática otorga una función central a la forma lingüística y los elementos lingüísticos analizados vienen definidos por sus relaciones combinatorias, según el modelo de análisis fonológico. Sus trabajos, que elaboran una tipología de los sistemas semióticos no lingüísticos, han ejercido una gran influencia en el desarrollo posterior de las ideas estructuralistas.

articulo muy bien escrito publicado en:
http://semioticaydesarrollo.blogspot.pe/2012/09/louis-hjelmslev.html



Otros desarrollos


Claude Levy-Strauss
Entre los mas importantes estan los de los formalistas rusos, de la escuela linguistíca de Praga y los de Roman Jakobson. El paradigma estructuralista  se fortalecio con los estudios de antropología estructural de Claude Levi-Strauss. Los Elements de semiologie de Roland Barthes (1964) en semiología estructuralista fueron decisivos. 


R. Barthes
Consecutivamente se encuentra:
1. Una revisión de la S de Peirce;
2. El nacimiento del estudio de los textos, como unidades fundamentales de la semiosis;
3.  La división entre el enfoque generativo y el enfoque interpretativo;
4.  La tentativa de unir el enfoque estructuralista y el peirciano.
5. La extensión del concepto de semiosis al mundo natural. 

Semiosis
El término indica la acción del signo y los procesos de inferencia por medio de los cuales algo es considerado signo de otro algo por un interprete humano.

Peirce theory of signs

Ref.

Ch. W. Morris. (1938). Foundations of the Theory of Signs. 
Max Bense, (1967). Semiotik Allgemeine Theorie der Zeichen.
Umberto Eco. (1975). Tratatto di semiotica generale. 

ECO, U., Tratado de semiótica general, Ed. Lumen, Barcelona, 1981
FREGE, G., Estudios sobre semántica, Ed. Ariel, Barcelona, 1973.
MORRIS, C., Foundations on the unity of science, O. Neurath, R. Carnap y C. Morris (eds), Ed. The University of Chicago Press, 1971, vol. I, 
__ Fun­damentos de la teo­ría de los signos, Ed. Paidós, Barcelona, 1985.
PEIRCE, CH. S., Collected Papers, Ed. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachussets, 1978-80.
__ Obra lógico-semiótica, Ed. Taurus, Madrid, 1987.
__ El hombre, un signo, Ed. Crítica, Barcelona, 1988.
__ Escritos lógico-semióticos, Ed. Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1988.

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